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Abstract
I have two goals in these remarks: to support Elshtain’s Augustinian argument in her lec-
ture that there can be no true peace with tyrannical regimes, and to critique the U.N. versus U.S.
dichotomy that she employs in her most recent book, Just War Against Terror. This book was
finished after September 11, 2001 and the war against the Taliban, but before the current U.S. ad-
ministration began advocating a war to overthrow Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq. Yet the questions
that her book raises have become even more relevant since the breakdown of our old alliances over
the Iraq war.
JUST WAR THEORY REQUIRES
A NEW FEDERATION OF
DEMOCRATIC NATIONS*
JohnJ Davenport**
I. DEMOCRACY -* EQUAL REGARD -4
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
In an important new article, James T. Johnson has argued
that Catholic moral theology "needs to reestablish a connection
with the broader and deeper just war tradition," especially in its
classical forms, in order to revive the idea of "force as a tool to
be employed in the proper exercise of government to combat
evil .. . in the service of the public goods of justice, order, and
peace."1 No one has done more to restore this idea to its proper
place in Catholic theology and political discourse than Jean
Bethke Elshtain.2 Elshtain and I are in broad agreement that
natural laws concerning just war not only set strict limits on the
circumstances in which war may be declared and the methods by
which it may be fought, but also - contrary to many in the just
war tradition - that just cause for war extends beyond self-de-
fense and sometimes arises from the general duty to protect in-
nocent human beings everywhere from tyranny and crimes
against humanity. I differ from Elshtain in holding that this duty
applies primarily to the collective of all democratic peoples, and
that it can only be pursued effectively - whether through
armed humanitarian interventions or other means short of war
- by a legitimate union of democratic Nations. This third way is
so obviously superior both to the outdated U.N. Security Council
system and to current U.S. unilateralism that one wonders how
* Originally presented at the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium on September 9,
2004, held at Fordham University, School of Law. I would like to thank Josephine Liu,
Managing Editor of the Fordham International LawJourna for extensive help both with
formatting and the addition of relevant citations to recent periodicals.
** Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Fordham University; Ph.D.,
1998, Notre Dame; B.A., 1989, Yale University.
1. James Turner Johnson, Just War as it Was and Is, 149 FIRST THINGS 14, 15 (2005)
[hereinafter Johnson, Just War as it Was].
2. See Jean Bethke Elshtain Biography, available at http://ethicscenter.nd.edu/
about/elshtain.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (noting that Elshtain, a political philoso-
pher and theologian, has shown the connections between our political and our ethical
convictions).
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either of these approaches could still seriously be defended -
unless one wishes either to rationalize collective inaction in the
face of horrendous evils on the one hand, or to misuse natural
law as a justification for American hegemony on the other. Or
perhaps both sides in this debate simply suffer from a stunning
lack of political imagination and will.
Thus I have two goals in these remarks: to support
Elshtain's Augustinian argument in her lecture' that there can
be no true peace with tyrannical regimes, and to critique the
U.N. versus U.S. dichotomy that she employs in her most recent
book, Just War Against Terror.4 This book was finished after Sep-
tember 11, 2001 and the war against the Taliban, but before the
current U.S. administration began advocating a war to overthrow
Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq.5 Yet the questions that her book
raises have become even more relevant since the breakdown of
our old alliances over the Iraq war.6
Elshtain's conception of natural law is based on the idea
that a shared human nature gives us "a responsibility to and for
one another to serve and love our neighbors."' Contra pacificist
interpretations of agape, Elshtain emphasizes that loving our
neighbor sometimes requires the use of force to protect her
from slaughter or ongoing oppression.' The central idea in this
argument is that justice, understood as including the defense of
universal human rights (by force when necessary) is an essential
part of "caritas or neighbor love."9 This explains why an agapic
conception of just war extends to the protection of third parties
beyond one's own borders, in contrast to the Hobbesian view
that limits just war to self-defense and the restoration of the sta-
3. SeeJean Bethke Elshtain, The Just War Tradition and Natural Law, 28 FoRDAtsM
INT'L LJ. 742 (2005).
4. See generally JEAN BETHKE ELSTHAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR: THE BURDEN OF
AMERICAN POWER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (2003).
5. See id.; see also Michael R. Gordon, A Nation at War: Military Analysis; Slower Pace,
Not a Pause, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at Al.
6. See Christopher Adams & Danial Dombey, Iran and China Top Rice's Europe
Agenda, FIN. TIMES (U.K), Feb. 4, 2005, at 7 (noting that U.S. foreign policy will be
rebuilding ties frayed by the Iraq war).
7. See Elshtain, supra note 3, at 749.
8. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 126 ("For the pacifist, peace is the highest good
and if injustice prevails, it must be contested with nonviolent weapons").
9. See id. at 150 ("governments and citizens of one country may be called upon to
protect citizens of another country... who are not in a position to defend themselves
from harm."); see also Elshtain, supra note 3, at 751.
JUST WAR THEORY
tus quo ante, because it conceives the rules of war as a merely a
minimal contract for mutual benefit between self-interested
States.' ° On this Hobbesian view, any Nation could legitimately
withdraw from treaties limiting allowable causes and modes of
warfare if it became so powerful that it no longer needed their
protection.
This stands in sharp contrast to any natural law approach
that begins from a conception of inviolable human dignity.11
Elshtain's version adds the specifically Christian idea that the ex-
treme violence suffered by so many innocent persons at the
hands of repressive regimes and warlords around the globe is a
symptom of the bondage of sin, which we have a duty to oppose
in the name of the savior who rescues from sin.1 2 But normative
conceptions of democracy that purport to be independent of re-
vealed truths also take the natural capacity for moral motivation
and the ability of rational choosing beings to arrive at insight
about the common good through deliberation to be the reason
why popular sovereignty is justified. 3 Abraham Lincoln also
seems to have believed that a commonly accessible natural mo-
rality recognizing the dignity of persons underlies the legitimacy
of democratic government (which is why no people or their leg-
islature can make any legitimate law violating such basic dig-
nity).1 4 Thus it is not only because the principle of "equal re-
10. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 4748 (discussing Thomas Hobbes's theory of the
state of nature as a war of all against all).
11. See id. at 48 (contrasting the concept of human dignity by describing "the life
of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
183, 186 (1983).
12. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 41 (stating that "some sins are most assuredly
crimes and rightfully fall under the censure and punishment of civil authority.").
13. See id. at 168 (arguing that "true international justice is defined as the equal
claim of all persons, whatever their political location or condition"). For example, con-
sider the theory of democratic legitimacy developed by Jfirgen Habermas in Between
Facts and Norms. SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans.,
1996).
14. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 168 (stating that the principle of equal regard lies
at the heart of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address); see also ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LINCOLN ON
DEMOCRACY (Harold Holzer & Mario Cuomo eds., 2004); HARRY V. JAFFA, CISIS OF THE
HOUSE DIVIDED (1959). I do not agree with Elshtain's view that American fundamental-
ists are no serious threat to democracy, because they embrace the separation of church
and State. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 147. On the contrary, many of our own funda-
mentalists reject this distinction, although they hardly advocate religious laws as severe
as the sharia. And as Elshtain is well aware, there are plenty of political philosophers
today who defend the idea that any religious conviction based on revelation or clerical
authority is a legitimate basis for voting and political advocacy, thus threatening to elim-
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gard" has become increasingly recognized in international law
that its implications for humanitarian intervention should be ac-
cepted in the global order.1" The very idea that democratic gov-
ernment can be legitimate, or can be more than a mere tyranny
of the majority, requires the principle of equal regard (along
with related assumptions about rational powers and educability
for citizenship).6 It follows that if democratic law is legitimate
in any Nation-State, then no human being can legitimately be
left in what Elshtain calls the "violent state of nature outside the
boundaries of moral concern. 17 And like the thousands being
butchered and exiled by Islamic fundamentalist militias in south-
ern Sudan today, the people of Iraq were certainly not living in
peace under Hussein.18 This must be recognized whatever one
thinks of the current administration's approach to foreign pol-
icy.
II. CENTRAL ARTICLES OF A JUST WAR DOCTRINE BASED
ON NATURAL LAW
Whether based on the respect required by common human
dignity, or based on the universal charity required by the imago
dei in all human beings, or on the moral presuppositions of legit-
imate popular sovereignty, then, just war theory must be part of
a broader conception of natural justice that both limits what can
be done to persons for the sake of any other end, and makes
positive demands on us not to stand idly by the blood of our
neighbor. Although she does not spell out the complete con-
ception ofjustice of which it is a part, Jean Elshtain develops the
just war doctrine that follows from any of these natural law ap-
proaches in Just War Against Terror.19 Here are some of its cen-
tral points and corollaries:
inate the normative and epistemic distinction between democracy and popular theoc-
racy.
15. See EsrrAIN, supra note 4, at 168 (arguing that "equal regard is an ideal of
international justice whose time has come."); see also Elshtain, supra note 3, at 753.
16. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 168.
17. Elshtain, supra note 3, at 751. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 151 (stating that
the United States, as a democracy has a role of preventing or interdicting violence in
other countries).
18. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 88 (noting that it is a gross distortion to suggest
that Iraqi suffering is caused by the United States, while neglecting the direct responsi-
bility of Saddam Hussein for such suffering); see also Elshtain, supra note 3, at 711.
19. See generally ELSHTAIN, supra note 4.
JUST WAR THEORY
1. There can be just wars when the injustice to be rectified or
prevented is sufficiently serious and not otherwise correct-
able by diplomacy or other means short of war;
20
2. Terrorism is morally distinct from warfare, and by defini-
tion employs means that violate the most basic norms of
just war (such as indiscriminately targeting non-combat-
ants);21
3. War against terrorist groups operating within and beyond
the boundaries of individual States can be just, when it is
prosecuted by just means proportional to the evil and dis-
criminating between combatants and civilians, and respect-
ing fundamental rights of prisoners22 (a limitation that the
infamous White House memorandum on torture to our
new Attorney General 23 did not recognize as binding on
the U.S. President, unfortunately);
4. If fundamentalist Islamic movements are radically opposed
to the most basic moral principles foundational to western
democracies, and cannot be reasoned with, easily ap-
peased, or brought into negotiation and compromise via
ordinary diplomacy, then leaders of such movements be-
come legitimate targets of pre-emptory self-defense on our
part.2 4 I agree with Elshtain on the facts here, and would
add that despite the liberation of Afghanistan from the
horrendous Taliban regime, an "Iron Veil" has descended
across much of southern Asia, from Saudi Arabia to Paki-
stan to Indonesia. Its madrasas teaching religious hatred,
conspiracy theories, and extreme versions of the sharia re-
present a threat to democracy and human rights as severe
as the fallen Iron Curtain of Europe's recent past.
5. States with regimes that actively support and encourage
such fundamentalist movements and associated terrorist
groups, or that are too weak to stop them, lose their legiti-
macy within the international order, and may justly be
overthrown if legitimate means to this end are practically
available, and democratic governments can probably be es-
20. See id. at 46-58.
21. See id. at 59-70.
22. See id. at 69-70.
23. See Memorandum fromJay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the DOD, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na-
tion/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
24. See generally ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 13949.
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tablished in their place. 25 It is an important implication of
this point, in my view, that the politically feasible remedies
for a Nation run by a tyrant, rival warlords, or terrorist
groups not be worse than the current evil.
6. Finally, wars morally may (and sometimes even ought to
be) waged not in self-defense, but for purely humanitarian
purposes, i.e., defending innocent third parties from geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities.26
This last point needs to be emphasized, given a resolution
adopted in 2003 by the Eastern Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association ("APA") in protest against the Bush Admin-
istration's plans to invade Iraq.27 The APA resolution reads, in
part: "Both just war theory and international law say that
[S] tates may resort to war only in self-defense." 28 Now to reject
this APA doctrine is not necessarily to hold that the current ad-
ministration ever justified unilateral war against Hussein, either
by reference to any dangers he posed to us, or for the sake of the
Iraqi people. But the 82% of Eastern APA philosophers who
voted for such a naively worded resolution against that war need
to be reminded, as Elshtain writes, that
An additional feature of the just war tradition, less empha-
sized than self-defense, holds that the governments and citi-
zens of one country may be called upon to protect citizens of
another country, or a minority within that country, who are
not in a position to defend themselves from harm.2 9
Thus the equal regard principle implies "the equal claim of all
persons... to having coercive force deployed in their behalf if
they are victims of one of the many horrors attendant upon radi-
cal political instability."' ° And equal regard for all humanity also
implies a shared responsibility to prevent catastrophes that take
innocent lives (e.g., by establishing warning systems to alert
coastal populations when tsunamis are coming).
Given that the defense of innocent third parties, under-
taken without any direct or even indirect connection to national
25. See id. at 140-45.
26. See generally ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 150-60.
27. See American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division APA: The Resolution
Against War With Iraq Passed, 1,202 to 263, at http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divi-
sions/eastern/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
28. Id.
29. ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 150.
30. Id. at 168.
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self-interest, is central to just war theory, one must wonder why
the U.N. Charter seems to forbid such humanitarian just wars"
- as Professor Lee points out in his response to Elshtain.32 The
Charter's limitation of U.N. Security Council authorizations of
force to missions aiming to maintain or restore prior defacto na-
tional boundaries arises from realpolitik, not from natural law or
any defensible conception of ideal justice. When the United Na-
tions was created out of the defunct League of Nations following
World War II, military power in the world was almost evenly bal-
anced between free democratic Nations and communist dictator-
ships, and the best that could be attained was a treaty organiza-
tion formally authorized to "keep the peace" in the Hobbesian
sense of maintaining the status quo in the global system of Na-
tion-States, while letting each regime do whatever it liked in its
internal affairs. Although the U.N. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights seems to impose substantial requirements on how
sovereign States govern their own people,33 in practice the U.N.
Charter's guarantee of unlimited national sovereignty over inter-
nal affairs34 has governed most of the Security Council's actions
through at least the 1980s. 5 Moreover, although the Declara-
tion says that everyone is entitled to democratic government,36
and that "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international or-
der in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion can be fully realized,"3 " in fact the only entity empowered by
the U.N. Charter that could conceivably organize such an inter-
national order or enforce human rights (namely the Security
Council) was constituted with two tyrannies among its five per-
manent members, and many dictatorships, monarchies, and the-
ocracies among its rotating members.
Today the strategic reasons that were valid in the late 1940s
for accepting such a grossly suboptimal arrangement no longer
exist, since collectively, democratic Nations now hold a prepon-
31. See U.N. CHARTER chs. 6-7.
32. See generally Thomas H. Lee, The Augustinian Just-War Tradition and the Problem of
Pretext in Humanitarian Intervention, 28 FOR-DAM INT'L L.J. 756 (2005).
33. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
34. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
35. See Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator:" Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 542, 554 (2005).
36. See UDHR, supra note 33, art. 21(3).
37. See id. art. 28.
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derance of the world's economic, military, and political power.
There is no longer any need to remain content with a system in
which dictatorships like China can exercise a veto over humani-
tarian interventions aimed at defending basic rights or replacing
rogue regimes with legitimate democracies. Given this fact, we
ought to re-examine the current global system headed by the
Security Council in light of the ideal implications of Elshtain's
principle of equal regard. As Johnson says, the principle of State
sovereignty in the natural law tradition requires that sovereign
power be aimed at the common good, in contrast with the "West-
phalian concept of sovereignty" as defacto monopoly on power in
a region, which remains the basis for the U.N. system." What
the principle of equal regard implies, in 2005, is that we ought to
establish a new global order in which the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is really enforced by the community of demo-
cratic Nations on this planet. This time has come when this is
now possible.
III. YET ELSHTAIN DEFENDS AMERICAN UNILATERALISM
AND LETS EUROPE OFF THE HOOK
Given these broad areas of agreement between us, I will now
focus on my disagreement with Elshtain's argument that the
United States must bear the main burden of the just war against
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism" (and apparently all other ef-
forts to stabilize free Nation-States), since "it is undeniably the
case that American political, diplomatic, economic, and military
power now structures and anchors the international system."4"
Rather than asking if this alleged fact of realpolitik should con-
tinue or what morally superior alternatives might be available,
Elshtain defends what looks (in hindsight) uncannily like an
early version of the "go-it-alone" doctrine that has made our cur-
rent Administration infamous throughout the world. But my
concern is with Elshtain's presentation of the popular yet false
dichotomy between taking the Security Council in its present
form as the final authority on Earth, or accepting U.S. unilateri-
alism. Without explaining what is really wrong with the U.N. sys-
tem, or why the problems could not be fixed, Elshtain simply
38. SeeJohnson, Just War as it Was, supra note 1, at 23.
39. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 161-73.
40. Id. at 151.
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tells us that the current network of international organizations
and courts is "not prepared" to meet the challenge of enforcing
basic human rights, repairing failed States, and defeating inter-
national terrorist movements. 4 1 So, she says, this job falls to us:
"There is no [S] tate except the United States with the power and
(we hope) the will to play this role".42 At times her tone reminds
one of past pronouncements that it is our manifest destiny to lead
the whole world:
At this point in time the possibility of international peace and
stability premised on equal regard for all rests largely, though
not exclusively, on American power. Many persons and pow-
ers do not like this fact, but it is inescapable....
... As the world's superpower, America bears the responsibil-
ity to help guarantee that international stability, whether
much of the world wants it or not.
43
Indeed, at a couple heady points, Elshtain even compares the
current role of the United States to that of the Roman Empire in
the ancient world 4 and considers Michael Ignatieff's suggestion
that we should engage in a new, benevolent kind of "imperial-
ism" (though she rejects this term) .4' Her position in these parts
of the book is closely related to the "Statement of Principles" of
the Project for the New American Century.46
41. See id. at 167.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 169.
44. See id. at 151.
45. See id. at 177-78.
46. See Statement of Principles (June 3, 1997), available at http://www.newameri-
cancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm. The Statement of Principles proclaims:
"We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership. As the
20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent
power." Id. We need a "national leadership that accepts the United States' global re-
sponsibilities." Id. The Statement listed as two of four consequences: "we need to pro-
mote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; we need to accept responsi-
bility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order
friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles." Id. The Statement was
signed by Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Richard Cheney,
Francis Fukuyama, Donald Kagan, Dan Qualye, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz,
among others. See id. Although there is wisdom in its counsel against isolationism, this
Statement's unilateralist position now appears highly problematic. Moreover, it as-
sumes a tight connection between democratic rights and capitalism, to which soft
despotist regimes with high economic growth rates are glaring counterexamples. The
New American Century editorialists continually take for granted that American uni-
20051
772 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:763
This approach to the problem of defending human rights is
nothing short of disastrous, especially given the fact that under
every Republican administration from Eisenhower to Reagan,
the United States intervened around the world in ways utterly
inconsistent with Elshtain's laudable vision of just war: funding
tyrants like Saddam Hussein and the Shah in Iran,4 7 supporting
far-right regimes with their death squads to oppose socialism
throughout Latin America,48 having democratically elected lead-
ers in Chile and Bangladesh murdered,4 9 and so on. Given this
bad track record, which has really changed only since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, it remains very easy for both our enemies and
our Cold-War allies to see the United States as meglomaniacally
bent on a quest for world dominance and wealth. Only an equal
partnership with the world's other major democracies, including
our commitment to live by cooperative decisions about political
crises and atrocities, can assure that our well-intentioned efforts
to fight terrorism and uphold basic rights through the world
cannot be misconstrued as an arrogant and self-interested cam-
paign for total hegemony. The price for U.S. unilateralism is
that we become the lightening rod for Islamic fundamentalist
hatred around the globe, and the focus is taken off the crimes of
dictators and warlords and fundamentalist militias everywhere.5"
lateralism and the current U.N. system are the only possible alternatives. See, e.g., Robert
Kagan, Multilateralism, American Style, WASH. POST, Sept.13, 2002, at A30.
47. See, e.g., William Ray, U.S. Leadership? No Thanks, DAiLYYoMIURI, Aug. 30,1993,
at 8 (alluding to the United States' policy of funding Saddam Hussein); Peter Reddaway
& Dmitri Glinski, Diplomacy; To Really Bail Out Russia, West Must Deny the Loans, L.A.
TIMES, July 19, 1998, at MI (noting that the United States armed and funded the Shah
of Iran).
48. See, e.g., Gregory L. Smith, Immune to Truth? Latin American Truth Commissions
and U.S. Support for Abusive Regimes, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 241, 248 (2001); Mark
Gibney, United States'Responsibility for Gross Levels of Human Rights Violations in Guatemala
From 1954 to 1996, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 77 (1997); Diana Jean Schemo, Latin Death
Squads and U.S.: A New Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A6.
49. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations, Alleged
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. REP. No. 94-465, at 225 (1975), available at
http://www.history-matters.com/archive/church/reports/ir/contents.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005); Alexander Cockburn, Killer Elite; U.S. Bombing of Baghdad, Iraq, NEW
STATESMAN & SOCIErY, July 2, 1993, at 14 (commenting that inferential evidence exists
that the order for assassination of Chile's newly elected president, Salvador Allende,
came out of White House of Nixon and his security adviser Henry Kissinger); CIA said to
be Implicated in ZiaurRahman'sDeath, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1981,
at SU/6750/A3/2.
50. See, e.g.,John Quigley, Identifying the Origins ofAnti-American Terrorism, 56 FLA. L.
REv. 1003, 1010 (2004) (quoting a New York Times comment by a French scholar who
JUST WAR THEORY
Thus, even when our interventions are justified, they are
plagued by hatreds fanned by fear of American libido domi-
nandi.5' As a result, our volunteer army, reserves, and national
guard are exhausted. By contrast, imagine that somehow, the
army that liberated Iraq had been composed entirely of Asian
and European forces, without any significant American pres-
ence. The guerilla war against these troops and the fledgling
Iraqi democracy would surely never have developed with the
same virulence. Just as the police cannot operate effectively in
communities in which they are systematically distrusted by the
people they are supposed to defend, the United States cannot
effectively operate as the world's policemen when even op-
pressed peoples have developed an immune reaction to our
presence.
Elshtain does not address this problem, nor the obvious fact
that American military power and resources are finite and now
stretched to their limit, while a fast-growing U.S.$7.7 trillion na-
tional debt fueled by avaricious tax cuts poses an increasingly
serious threat to our national security.52 Elshtain approves the
current administration's ideas about "great power and great re-
sponsibility,""3 but forgets entirely the lesson of Paul Kennedy's
The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, which warned that such an ap-
proach has historically led to the collapse of empires.54 Instead,
Elshtain plays right into foreign suspicions that American inten-
tions are simply imperialist.5 5 As a result, she provides perfect
cover for Asian, European, and South American democracies to
wrote that "bin Laden had 'Islamized the traditional discourse of Western anti-imperial-
ism. So a lot of Muslims support him, not because they see him as true warrior for
Islam, but because they hate America, and he's the only man in the Islamic world that
they see fighting the Americans'").
51. See Quigley, supra note 50, at 1013 ("Even when an action enjoys some popular
support in the region, such as the removal from power of the Ba'ath Party, the overall
reaction to the United States may be negative. Bombings that cause high civilian casual-
ties and the torture of Iraqi detainees confirmed for many Iraqis their view that the
United States does not respect the people of the region .... Our actions often assist
those who recruit for terrorist organizations.").
52. Recent research shows that the U.S. national debt is U.S.$7.7 trillion. See By-
ron August & Mark Strama, The Biggest Tax is Debt, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2003, at A15
(noting that the national debt was U.S.$6.6 trillion in 2003).
53. ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 158.
54. See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RiSE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987).
55. See Roger Cohen, The World: The Ends of Empire; Strange Bedfellows: "Imperial
America" Retreats From Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, at 46 (noting that "Europeans...
have come to a view of Bush's America as imperialist").
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continue passing off their total inaction in humanitarian crises
as principled resistance to American hubris. Elshtain's Euro-
pean opponents appreciate the dichotomy she sets up, because it
allows them to portray their allegiance to the U.N. system as the
moral high road. Yet for fifteen years, France, Germany, and
other continental European Nations have stood idly by the
blood of their neighbors in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burma/My-
anmar, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and now
Sudan (to say nothing of ignoring long-running tyrannies in Ke-
nya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere).56 All these episodes of
ethnic cleansing, genocide, scorched earth warfare, warlord
atrocities, and kleptocratic repression have occurred in their for-
mer colonies, in their primary spheres of influence, not in ours -
yet in each case, they have refused to commit any ground troops to real
combat to save the innocent victims. Even Britain, underJohn Major
and the diplomatic leadership of Lord Owen, refused to fight
the Serbian fascists raping Bosnia, and thus undermined Presi-
dent Clinton while he was trying to organize a large multina-
tional NATO ground force to stop these atrocities. 7 How could
he possibly send an American army into combat to halt a Euro-
pean crises when the European Union itself refused to recipro-
cate?
Yet, in addition to reinforcing the false U.S. versus U.N. di-
chotomy, Elshtain ignores these European sins of omission. She
criticizes Bill Clinton for failure to send troops in to protect the
Tutsis in Rwanda,5" but says nothing about Europe's failure to
aid its own former colony. In Bosnia, she says:
56. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 155-58; see also SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM
FROM HELL 503 (2002); R. Bruce Hitchner, Lessons Learned in Nation-Building: Rethinking
International Community Priorities, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 25, 26-27 (2004) (stating that
"[t]here is no lack of plans and contingencies for dealing with the crisis in Darfur. Yet,
as with Rwanda, what is lacking is the will to act. And that will does not exist because
the international community has other priorities.").
57. See, e.g. Jim Hoagland, To Holbrooke, It's Goodbye for Now, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
1996, at C11; Warren Hoge, Crisis in the Balkans: The British: Blair's Anger Fuled Support
for Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at A12; Warren Bass, The Triage of Dayton, 77 FOR-
EIGN AFF., Sept./Oct., at 95 (1998).
58. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 155-56. During a Larry King interview (in early
August 2004), President Clinton said that he regarded his not acting quickly to save
800,000 Tutsis from genocide in Rwanda as one of one his gravest mistakes, and he
expressed apparently sincere remorse for not sending in an American army. To my
knowledge, neither Gerhard Schr6der nor Jacques Chirac has ever expressed similar
remorse.
JUST WAR THEORY
safe havens were declared and the people who fled to them
for safety were often shot to pieces as the [United Nations]
stood by and the United States kept promising action and do-
ing nothing. President Clinton's "strong words" coupled with
inaction have been criticized subsequently for giving the Bos-
nia Muslims false hope, "which [they] paid for with blood."5 9
This accusation is scandalously misdirected. It was the fault of
John Major, Helmut Kohl, Franiois Mitterand, and their Euro-
pean peers that Bosnian Serbs could attack Sarajevo with virtual
impunity for so long, before the United States brokered the Day-
ton Accords backed by our air power.6 ° The spectacular failure
of the European Union to form any common policy or take any
serious initiative to stop the Serbian death squads has disgraced
an entire generation of European politicians.61 It was the fault
of the Dutch army, not the American President, that thousands
of innocent Bosnians were slaughtered at the Srebrenica refugee
camp in 1995.62 While I agree with Elshtain's harsh words for
NATO's long delay in sending in ground troops to halt the rap-
ing and burning of Kosovo,6" this also was primarily the fault of
Europe, not Clinton or the U.S. Congress (as Elshtain alleges).64
Moreover, when NATO ground troops did enter Kosovo, they
were primarily American.65
59. See id. at 157.
60. See, e.g., Frank J. Murray, Clinton Warns of "Higher Price"for Serb Attacks; Wants to
Use Sarajevo Model, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1994, at Al; supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
61. Elshtain tells one story about a friend from the Czech Republic who com-
plained that U.S. inaction in Bosnia "signaled to the small peoples of Eastern Europe
that they could not count on the United States when the chips were down." ELSHTAIN,
supra note 4, at 178. But why is it the United States, an ocean away, on whom they
should be counting, rather than on the union of stable, wealthy, and powerful democra-
cies on their own continent?
62. See, e.g., Gregory Crouch, Dutch Send 1,100 Troops to Iraq, Relieving as Many U.S.
Marines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A8 (noting that "Dutch peacekeepers failed to
prevent the slaughter of thousands of Muslim men and boys in the Bosnian town of
Srebrenica in 1995"); Nicholas Wood, Bosnian Serbs Apologize for Srebrenica Massacre, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at A4 ("Srebrenica, officially designated a United Nations-pro-
tected zone, was defended by lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers. Thousands took ref-
uge in the Dutch camp but were handed over to [Serbian] General Mladic's forces,
which separated men and boys from their families, took them to other locations and
shot them").
63. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 157.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Walter F. Mondale, Reflections on Fifty Years of Progress in Civil Rights,
Liberties, and Participation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (stating that "one of the great
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This trend has continued ever since 1989 and the end of the
Cold War.6 6 Now, while the United States and Britain have been
bogged down in Iraq, France and Germany have not seriously
considered sending any forces into Sudan to stop the murder
and displacement of thousands of Sudanese refugees at the
hands of Islamic fundamentalist death squads in Darfur. 67 Their
leaders, as well as many of their ordinary citizens, prefer instead
to decry American imperialism, while seeking diplomatic solu-
tions to on-going atrocities (and making lucrative business deals
with the regimes committing the atrocities)!68 Whether or not
to engage major armies in humanitarian interventions isn't even
seen as an option worthy of serious consideration in continental
Europe. It is also taken for granted that any such initiative, if
even conceivable, would certainly require China's approval on
the U.N. Security Council.69 Much of continental Europe seems
now to assume that any armed intervention anywhere, for any
reason is automatically "colonialist," and that the only alternative
to the evils of colonialism is the most simplistic form of pacifism.
During the same fifteen-year period that European democ-
racies have abdicated almost all responsibility for the rest of the
world - and even for halting fascist genocide on their own conti-
nent - the United States eventually stopped Serbian aggression
in Bosnia and Kosovo,70 rescued Kuwait from Saddam Hussein, 7 1
captured Noriega and freed Panama,72 forced the dictators and
ironies of the modern era is that American troops have been put in harm's way more
often in the years following the conclusion of the Cold War than during its long, forty-
year span. First came the Persian Gulf War in 1991 ... and Kosovo in 1999.").
66. See, e.g, William B. Wood, Post-Conflict Intervention Revisited: Relief Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation, and Reform, 29-WTR FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 119, 120 (2005) (stating that
"[a] half-century later, after such disparate crises in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and
East Timor, a well-thumbed set of post-Cold War intervention blueprints now sits on the
shelves of United Nations and donor-assistance offices").
67. See, e.g., Hitchner, supra note 56, at 26-27
68. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 166; see also Maggie Farley, All Players Gained From
"Oil-for-Food"; On the U.N. Security Council, Competiting National Interests, and Economic
Stakes in Iraq Chilled Willingness to Scrutinize the Program, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at Al.
69. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23(1).
70. See id. at 157.
71. See, e.g., Caroline Faraj & Kianne Sadeq, Source: Terror Cell Held in Kuwait (Jan.
31, 2005), available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/31/kuwait.un-
rest/index.html.
72. See, e.g., Susan Levine, Military Honored for Its Sacrifices, From Pearl Harbor to Iraq,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 20, 2005, at A39.
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their Tonton Macoute death squads out of Haiti,73 and freed Af-
ghan women from the unmitigated brutality of the Taliban.74
The United States also tried unsuccessfully to save starving So-
mali people from the vicious thugs who terrorize that pseudo-
State and even rob non-political aid agencies. 7' The United
States also intervened weakly to help force warlord Charles Tay-
lor out of Liberia.76 Meanwhile, the people of the United States
continue to provide much of the defense for Japan, South Ko-
rea, and Taiwan (hardly weak Nations).77 This contrast between
the United States and other strong democracies is clear, quite
apart from any judgment one makes about the 2003-04 Iraq war.
Elshtain says nothing about the absence of Belgian, Dutch,
French, German, Italian, or Spanish troops, etc., from these ini-
tiatives, bought with American money and lives. However, at
least she criticizes European scholars for preferring appease-
ment of Islamic terrorist groups,78 and for their perverse assump-
tion that respect for cultural diversity requires non-intervention
when people are being butchered and tyrannized. 79 As Elshtain
rightly says, "[t] his strategy of abandonment, often justified as a
way to respect a culture's 'difference,' is actually a counsel of
indifference. To abandon a beleaguered people is to give them
less regard than they deserve as human beings.""° Aung San Suu
Kyi, the rightfully elected leader of Burma, concurs: "It is often
in the name of cultural integrity and national security that dem-
ocratic reforms based on human rights are resisted by authorita-
rian governments."81 But it is our Asian and European allies, not
73. See, e.g., Stephen Johnson, An Enlightened Intervention in Haiti, BAIT. SUN, Mar.
3, 2004, at 13A.
74. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 38-41.
75. See id. at 54.
76. See, e.g., William Powers, Seeing the Forest for the Peace; Liberating Liberia, INT'L
HERALD TmB., Jan. 11, 2005, at 6.
77. See, e.g., Kathrin Hille et al., North Asian Nuclear Tinderbox Hots Up in Aftermath of
South Korean Admission: The News Has Heightened Arms Race Concerns in Taipei and Tokyo,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 4, 2004, at 8.
78. See ELSHTA1N, supra note 4, at 147 (stating that the " [m] ost telling was the re-
sponse by the German journalists when they were asked how Germany would have re-
acted if it had been the target of an attack equivalent to the September 11 attacks on
America. The answer was unanimous: appeasment. Not pacifism, but appeasment.").
79. See id.
80. Id. at 155.
81. Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom, Development, and Human Worth, 6(2) J. DEMOCRACY
11, 14 (1995). Ms. Suu Kyi has been kept under house arrest by the military junta in
Burma off and on since her election for years.
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post-1989 U.S. policy-makers,82 who are guilty of encouraging
third-world leaders to use this perverse rationalization for refus-
ing to democratize.83
IV. THE RIGHT SOLUTION: A NEW FEDERATION OF
DEMOCRATIC NATIONS
In sum, the United States cannot play the role that Elshtain
wants: becoming "the leading guarantor of a structure of stabil-
ity and order in a violent world,"8 4 while European and other
strong democracies refuse to do their share under the guise of
respect for international law. The result of American unilateral-
ism will be a bankrupt Nation plagued by terrorism, forced to
return to the draft, and irretrievably alienated from allies who
see themselves as morally superior, while the Iron Veil grows -
and no one rescues victims of atrocities in other Nations around
the world.8 5 If we want to bring justice and peace to this planet,
and stop fundamentalist theocracy in the process, then we have
to jettison Elshtain's myth of our "unparalled supremacy" 6 and
start working to create a completely new institutional framework
to play the role that the Security Council never could play, be-
cause it began as a mere treaty organization that includes tyran-
nies among its permanent and rotating members.
What is needed is a new framework in which every major
democratic State pledges ground troops and resources commen-
82. That is, the United States since the end of the Cold War and the demise is
Kissingerian support for anti-communist regimes at any and all costs to human rights.
83. One might think in this regard of the outcry among many European and some
American intellectuals against Habermas's claim that human rights are a condition of
legitimate government everywhere, rather than a norm valid only in Western cultures.
See Bill Martin, Eurocentrically Distorted Communication, in PERSPECrIVES ON HABERMAS 411-
22 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 2000).
84. ELSH-rAIN, supra note 4, at 173.
85. Consider the Spanish electorate changing its preferences following the Madrid
train bombings and electing an administration pledged to disengage from joint military
operations with the United States in order to avoid more punishment from al Qaeda.
See, e.g., Isambard Wildinson, Voter Anger and Grief Give Anti-War Parties Win in Spain:
Socialist Party Promises to Withdraw 1,300 Troops From Iraq, VANCOUVER SUN (CAN.), Mar.
15, 2004, at Al; Enda O'Doherty, Views from the European Press, IR. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004,
at 8. Did the new Spanish administration then pledge any troops to protect the Korean
demilitarized zone, or to act as peacekeepers in Darfur, or to a coalition to free Liberia
of warlords or to rescue Zimbabwe from the tyrannical oppression of Robert Mugabe?
Of course intervention in these cases for the sake of human rights was not even consid-
ered.
86. ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 178.
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surate with its size to a permanent alliance that does not need to
reorganize every time a crisis starts. This alliance would oppose
tyranny, theocracy, and terrorism everywhere, and uphold fun-
damental human rights by force when necessary. To be legiti-
mate, this alliance would have to become an actual Federation of
Democratic Nations, whose ultimate decision-making body
would be directly elected by the peoples of the member States,
rather than merely being appointed as proxies for national gov-
ernments. To be sufficiently powerful, it would also have to
function as an equal partnership between Europe, the United
States, and other major democracies around the world. Its deci-
sions would also have to bind all the member States.
The need for such a Democratic Federation follows from
Elshtain's own theory for two reasons. First, because it would
represent all free peoples who recognize natural human dignity,
the Democratic Federation could wage just wars with far greater
perceived legitimacy and impartiality than any single Nation or small
group of Nations. Whenever any Nation X would be justified,
according to Elshtain's principles, in waging war against another
Nation Y, then the Democratic Federation would always be more
justified in waging this war on behalf of all democratic peoples
against Y. This is exactly analogous to the way in which, when
any single individual may justly use force to defend himself or to
defend other innocent third parties against aggressors, it is usu-
ally better for the State to do this for him - and indeed the bulk
of the State's police powers are derived from this point.87
Second, only such a Democratic Federation would really
have sufficient power and resources to promote democracy and
human rights around the globe, fight a global war against terror-
ism, and respond pre-emptively to stop atrocities before they be-
come mass murder. It would rescue any single Nation or people
87. For example, courts have used the idea of collective self-defense to justify the
State's police power to confine individuals against their will under certain circum-
stances, such as individuals with highly contagious disease and mentally ill patients who
pose threats to others or to themselves. SeeJacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)
("[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint ... as the safety of the general
public may demand."); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police
power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of
significant antisocial acts or communicable disease.").
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from having to fight a just war by themselves, or with whatever
small band of allies they are able to cobble together at the elev-
enth hour-usually at considerable delay. Any natural law con-
ception of just wars has to regard this as a major improvement.
Other things being equal, it would always be better for all free
Nations to back up any one Nation that has to engage in a just
war.
Elshtain only briefly considers and dismisses this line of
thought without seriously exploring possibilities outside her ba-
sic dichotomy:
If the claim to justice as equal regard applies to all persons
without distinction, shouldn't an international body be its
guarantor and enforcer? Perhaps. But in our less-than-ideal
world, the one candidate to guarantee this principle is the
United States, for two reasons: Equal regard is the founda-
tion of our own polity, and we are the only superpower.8 8
This is a poor argument, because its second (empirical) premise
is simply false: the United States is not the only democratic Na-
tion capable of building significant armed forces or of funding
Nation-building operations, like the Marshall Plan following
World War 11.89 Together, the NATO Nations or the European
Union have a military capacity and economic strength that ap-
proaches our own; if one adds in Russia, their capability easily
equals or exceeds ours. The European Union does not rank as a
"superpower" in Elshtain's analysis only because it has worked to
avoid the responsibility that would go with that status, and sadly,
Elshtain seems happy to help the European Union continue do-
ing just that, since it will promote American ascendance.
My proposal also avoids the error that Elshtain (somewhat
misleadingly) calls "liberal internationalism.""° By this term, she
means naive faith that entities like the United Nations, the Inter-
national Criminal Court ("ICC"), the Hague War Crimes tribu-
nal, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and non-
governmental organizations like Amnesty International can
somehow between them secure the stable Nation-States and per-
form the Nation-building that we need to prevent terrorist
breeding grounds in failed States and warlord dictatorships prey-
88. ELSHTAN, supra note 4, at 168.
89. See id. at 154.
90. See id. at 171.
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ing on their own people. These courts, treaty-based financial or-
ganizations, private lobbies, and charities should not really be
lumped together this way just because they operate at the trans-
national level. Some of these institutions, like the ICC, are cer-
tainly meant to promote Elshtain's own conception of universal
human dignity," and her scorn for them seems to be a kneejerk
reaction against any limits to the absolute sovereignty of the
United States. But this position is obviously incompatible with a
natural law conception of global justice that limits the sover-
eignty of individual Nation-States, as we have seen. Elshtain's
own hero, Vdclav Havel, argues forcefully that rejecting "The
idol of [S] tate sovereignty" should pave the way to overcoming
"the idea of non-intervention" built into the U.N. system.92
Havel calls for "a world of ever closer cooperation on a footing
of equality among larger and mostly transnational bodies .... "
91. See ELSHTAIN, supra note 4, at 164. I find Elshtain's critique of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("ICC") particularly inapposite, even though I agree that the ICC
ought to be accountable to a higher authority, such as the new Democratic Federation
that I propose here. I am especially disturbed by her quote from George Will, who
claims that the ICC is nothing but a European strategy for diluting national sovereignty.
See id. at 164. Why would any just war theorist who believes that national sovereignty is
limited by the obligation to uphold basic rights want to associate herself with partisans
who reject any possibility of primary sovereignty for transnational institutions of any
kind? This is especially disturbing since Elshtain was finishing this book a few months
after Secretary of State Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush declared that the ICC
could have no jurisdiction over U.S. armed forces - so that, for instance, if American
soldiers acting under U.N. color committed some massacre, they could not be prose-
cuted in the ICC for crimes against humanity. It is now clear that that decision antici-
pated the more recent Bush doctrine that even the Geneva Convention and other bod-
ies of international law concerning just war and just treatment of prisoners of war do
not bind the U.S. government or its agents. See Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean
Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or "Extra-Conventional Persons": How Unlawful Combatants in
the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28
FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 681, 700-728 (2005). Any defender of just wars in the natural law
tradition must surely dissociate herself from such a doctrine. How can we possibly ex-
pect international law concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity to bind
every Nation except the United States?! This is precisely the kind of claim that has alien-
ated Europeans who ought to be first partners in fighting for global justice. I would
also call on Elshtain to disassociate herself from George Will's great teacher, Henry
Kissinger, a quote from whom appears on the back cover of her book. For as Christo-
pher Hitchens has proven beyond any reasonable doubt, this is a man who should him-
self be under prosecution at the ICC. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TIAL OF HENRY
KISSINGER (2001). It is a shame to see Elshtain's enlightened theory of global justice
held hostage to the most cynical Chicago School realpolitik.
92. Vclav Havel, Beyond the Nation-State, 3 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 26, 26-27
(1999).
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in order to replace the current Security Council.93 Havel recog-
nizes that building such a just global order cannot succeed with-
out "the systematic creation of a universal civil society" rooted in
democratic values. 94
So I agree with Elshtain that international courts alone can-
not enforce fundamental human rights and uphold fraud-free
States. That power should only vest in an institution that exer-
cises legitimate primary sovereignty over the basic structure of
our global system, making and enforcing fundamental Terran
Law for the whole world. 95 Since this responsibility is shared
equally by all peoples, any people who are represented by a legit-
imate democratic government should have a proportionate voice
in making such law. Thus legitimate authority for keeping au-
thentic peace and assuring fundamental human dignity ought to
be vested in a federation of democratic Nations. This new Dem-
ocratic Federation ought to have a short but absolutely vital list
of enumerated functions, including first and foremost
1. swift intervention when necessary to prevent genocide,
ethnic cleaning, and other atrocities;
2. the general enforcement of human rights, including
(when possible) the removal and prosecution of tyrants
and warlords, and the punishment of crimes against hu-
manity;
3. the defeat of international terrorist organizations and in-
ternational crime rings;
4. the commonly undertaken and collectively funded defense
of all free and just member States from hostile incursion
or attack by outlaw States or terrorists;
5. the exertion of unified diplomatic pressure on non-demo-
cratic governments everywhere to democratize.
6. the Nation-building activities necessary to assure all peo-
93. See id. at 29-30.
94. Vdclav Havel, Democracy, the State, and Civil Society, 33 REuclous HusiAr.IsM 46,
55 (2001). This article derives from a speech that Havel delivered at Macalester College
in Minnesota on April 26, 1999.
95. I do not say "international law" here because that term implies that all primary
sovereignty is vested in national governments, and hence that all institutions perform-
ing legal functions above the national level derive all their sovereignty from treaties
among Nation-States, and only exercise whatever authority is continually granted to
them by Nation-States, any of which can veto deteriminations judged counter to their
national interests. This is exactly the assumption that I am challenging by proposing a
Federation of Democratic Nations, whose constitution and legislative acts would consti-
tute not "international law" but rather transnational or Terran Law.
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ples on Earth a stable democratic Nation-State of their
own, with a working legal system free from corruption of
the authorities, a liberal educational system free from fun-
damentalist indoctrination, and a decent standard of living
in whatever economic system they choose.9 6
This, as Elshtain and I agree, is the birthright of every child. I
hold that this birthright can only be assured by such a league of
democratic Nations, with standing armed forces sufficient to in-
tervene in crises on short-notice and to exercise an effective de-
terrence over rogue regimes. On Elshtain's approach, Europe
can continue to free-ride on increasingly ineffective U.S. efforts
to stop terrorism and bring down tyrants and protect innocents
from atrocities, which they will see as merely a continuation of
our aggressive, self-interested, and often highly unjust interven-
tions in the Cold War era.
If an American president proposed the kind of federation
I've outlined here, then major Asian, European, and South
American democracies would no longer be able to pretend that
this was just more American imperialism. For the Democratic
Federation would be an equal partnership binding on all its
members, including the United States. Americans would limit
our claimed right to act however we see fit, in order to bring
about a much stronger federation in which we no longer have to
bear almost all the burden and be the lighting rod of fundamen-
talist hatred. We would also be rid of the corrupt Security Coun-
cil and no longer be humiliated by having to sit as equals with its
dictators, theocracies, monarchies, and other illegitimate mem-
bers. In turn, other major democracies would gain the assur-
ance of United States compliance with this just regime of trans-
national law, in exchange for which they should pledge their
money and lives. How could our erstwhile allies refuse, when
the point of this new Democratic Federation would be finally to
96. I would add other enumerated powers to this list, including preservation of the
world's environments, management of a global financial system and global currency,
setting world interest rates, eliminating tax havens and setting minimum individual,
and corporate taxes world-wide, leveling the playing field between Nations with free-
trade agreements involving parity in worker safety and environmental laws, taking over
management of the World Bank and World Health Organization, and conducting anti-
trust activities to prevent the formation of overly large multinational corporations capa-
ble of exerting undue influence on small Nations. But these functions are all secondary
to replacing the Security Council's present overly limited "peacekeeping" role, which is
my concern here.
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provide a real foundation and enforcement mechanism for
global law concerning basic human rights? If they refused to
join us as equal partners in this venture, they would be revealed
either as hypocrites or cowards, and then they would also face
the certain prospect of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal both from
the Security Council and from NATO.
Thus, I flatly reject the objection that this proposal is just
too utopian to be worth attention. The charge of "utopianism"
is often the Hobbit-hole of small minds and weak wills. The Fed-
eration I propose is not a "world government" representing
every Nation on earth, and it recognizes that we have to start
where we are. A single persuasive, smart, and truly just American
president who went to our former allies with open hands could
begin to build the Democratic Federation out of NATO. He or
she could present our allies with a clear choice between isolation
or equal participation, without any comforting myths about
American desires for world dominance, or illusions about Ameri-
can willingness to act unilaterally. Such an American president
would also explain to the American people the benefits of this
new Federation, given serious participation by other powerful
democracies around the world. The United States, like every
member, would reserve the right to resort to force of arms uni-
laterally to protect its citizens when under direct attack at home.
But outside of such emergencies, every member would bind it-
self to adhere to the joint policy of the whole. Starting from the
NATO Nations along with Australia, Japan, Mexico, and the Rus-
sian Federation, the founding members would establish com-
mon criteria for admitting new members, including hopefully
India, Israel, Tawain, the Philippines, South American democra-
cies, and South Korea. Even prior to this principled expansion,
such a Federation of Democratic Nations would obviously be the
ultimate power on Earth, and in addition to attracting new mem-
bers, would dictate terms to rogue regimes and exercise diplo-
matic pressure towards democratization everywhere. After a few
successful joint operations, force would rarely need to be used,
because the threat of its swift deployment in any crisis would be
highly credible (in contrast to the paper-tiger U.N. system), and
tyrants everywhere on this planet would realize that their days
were numbered. Once such an institution gained recognition as
the legitimate representative of the common will and wisdom of
democratic peoples everywhere, the possibilities are too great
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even to dream about. All this could be accomplished in the next
twenty years, given serious political will and skillful statesman-
ship.
CONCLUSION
As she is the best articulator and defender of the just war
tradition writing today, Jean Bethke Elshtain ought to be the
very first theologian and philosopher to advocate such a Federa-
tion of Democratic Nations to take the place of the international
entities that she finds so inadequate, and to perform the tasks
that she so rightly defines as the central moral imperatives for
the global order in the 21st Century. For the kind of Democratic
Federation I have proposed is implied by her own theory of just
war and embodies the natural principles that define justice be-
tween Nations. International vigilantism should and can be re-
placed with a legitimate global police power. Both as a matter of
pragmatic strategy and moral principle, then, Elshtain should re-
tract her endorsement of American unilitarialism and affirm a
new Democratic Federation as the solution for which we should
all start working. For unless such a Federation is established
within the next few decades, neither America nor the rest of the
world may have any future worth living in.
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